AbstractGasoline retail markets have traditionally attracted a lot of attention from researchers and policy makers. This entry reviews a set of questions studied by Industrial Organisation (IO) economists related to this market. The discussion is organised around three themes. The first reviews papers concerned with the transmission of cost shocks and the cyclical properties of gasoline prices. The second theme includes a variety of papers testing for market power, and providing evidence in favour of price discrimination, tacit collusion, differentiation and vertical restraints. Finally, the last section is devoted to papers evaluating the consequences of economic and environmental regulations in gasoline markets.
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This chapter was published in: Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (ed.) , , pages , 2010, 4th quarter update.
This item is provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its series The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics with number v:4:year:2010:doi:3838.
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- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Laurent Flochel & Bruno Versaevel, 2013.
"Optimal collusion with limited liability,"
International Journal of Economic Theory,
The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 203-227, 09.
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