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bidding rings

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  • John Asker
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    Abstract

    A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude in an auction in order to gain greater surplus by depressing competition. This entry describes some typical bidding rings and provides an introduction to the related theoretical and empirical literature.

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    This chapter was published in: Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (ed.) , , pages , 2010, 2nd quarter update.

    This item is provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its series The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics with number v:4:year:2010:doi:3822.

    Handle: RePEc:pal:dofeco:v:4:year:2010:doi:3822

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    Related research

    Keywords: Cartel; antitrust; bidding ring; bid rigging; Sherman Act; auctions; price fixing; bid rotation; collusion;

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