Schattenregulierung als Phänomen der Telekommunikationswirtschaft

Regulatory authorities enjoy considerable discretionary room to manoeuvre; we discuss the role of actual and potential regulations in telecommunications and critically focus on informal ‚shadow regulation’. Our analytical framework puts the focus on multinational companies in open economies so that we have a new approach – not least in terms of welfare economic analysis. In telecommunication markets with high dynamics of innovations shadow regulations will affect prices, investment, innovations and stock market prices of the regulated firm. Taking into account the considerable potential for process innovations and product innovations in both the field of network infrastructure and in digital services shadow regulations – reflecting uncertainty about regulatory policy at the intermediate input level – are considered to be a serious problem. As a higher risk of tough regulations implies that firms effectively face higher costs in investment and innovation projects, translating into higher prices, so that lower investments at the sectoral and aggregate level are to be expected. Governments interested in rational policy should emphasize trans-parency of regulation and minimisation of discretion in regulatory policy. (Original text only available in german language)