IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/eme/rexezz/s0193-230620160000019002.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Cheap Talk Games: Comparing Direct and Simplified Replications

In: Experiments in Organizational Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Fu-Wen Hsieh
  • Joseph Tao-yi Wang

Abstract

To study strategic information transmission in organizations, we conduct a simplified version (with only three states) of the sender-receiver game experiment designed by Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010), in which an informative sender advises an uninformed receiver to take an action (to match the true state), but has incentives to exaggerate. We also have the same subjects play the original five-state game. We find similar “overcommunication” behavior with Taiwanese subjects – messages reveal more information about the true state than what equilibrium predicts – that let us classify subjects into various level-ktypes. However, results from the simplified version are closer to equilibrium prediction, with more senders robustly classified as level-2.

Suggested Citation

  • Fu-Wen Hsieh & Joseph Tao-yi Wang, 2016. "Cheap Talk Games: Comparing Direct and Simplified Replications," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 19-38, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620160000019002
    DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620160000019002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S0193-230620160000019002/full/html?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S0193-230620160000019002/full/epub?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec&title=10.1108/S0193-230620160000019002
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S0193-230620160000019002/full/pdf?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1108/S0193-230620160000019002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sender-receiver game; strategic information transmission; lying; laboratory experiment; C72; C91; D83;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620160000019002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emerald Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.