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Changes in Controlling Shareholders’ Holdings: Do they Entail Financial Tunneling?

In: International Corporate Governance

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  • Menachem (Meni) Abudy
  • Beni Lauterbach

Abstract

We examine changes in controlling shareholder holdings, looking for evidence of financial tunneling (unfair wealth transfers from public investors to controlling shareholders). Our sample comprises yearly data during 2000–2011 on 75 large Israeli companies. We find that controlling shareholders are successful in timing the stock market – there exists a significant negative correlation between changes in the mean controlling shareholders’ equity holdings and market return. There is also some evidence that controlling shareholders increase (decrease) their holdings before years of positive (negative) excess returns in their shares. However, statistically significant mean excess returns are documented only after decreases in controlling shareholders’ holdings. Thus, we offer only limited support for the financial tunneling hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Menachem (Meni) Abudy & Beni Lauterbach, 2015. "Changes in Controlling Shareholders’ Holdings: Do they Entail Financial Tunneling?," Advances in Financial Economics, in: International Corporate Governance, volume 18, pages 47-63, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:afeczz:s1569-373220150000018002
    DOI: 10.1108/S1569-373220150000018002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hyunjung Choi & Jungeun Cho, 2021. "Related-Party Transactions, Chaebol Affiliations, and the Value of Cash Holdings," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-13, January.
    2. Hamdani, Assaf & Lauterbach, Beni & Mugerman, Yevgeny, 2020. "Reservation prices in shareholders’ response to freeze-out tender offers," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    3. Beni Lauterbach & Yevgeny Mugerman, 2020. "The Effect of Institutional Investors’ Voice on the Terms and Outcome of Freeze-out Tender Offers," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(01), pages 1-33, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Controlling shareholders; financial tunneling; G32; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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