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Bank Monitoring, Firm Performance, And Top Management Turnover In Japan

In: Advances in Financial Economics

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  • Christopher W Anderson
  • Terry L Campbell
  • Narayanan Jayaraman
  • Gershon N Mandelker

Abstract

An inverse relation between performance and managerial turnover at Japanese firms suggests that bank monitoring substitutes for other governance mechanisms (Kaplan, 1994; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995). Morck and Nakamura (1999), however, report that Japanese banks protect their self-interests as creditors rather than the interests of shareholders when appointing corporate directors. We re-examine data on top management changes at Japanese firms and find results consistent with this latter notion. Specifically, management turnover is conditionally related to a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations rather than profitability or stock returns. Bank monitoring is therefore not a substitute for mechanisms that directly serve shareholders’ interests.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher W Anderson & Terry L Campbell & Narayanan Jayaraman & Gershon N Mandelker, 2003. "Bank Monitoring, Firm Performance, And Top Management Turnover In Japan," Advances in Financial Economics, in: Advances in Financial Economics, pages 1-27, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:afeczz:s1569-3732(03)08001-0
    DOI: 10.1016/S1569-3732(03)08001-0
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