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Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications

In: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I

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  • Andrea Attar
  • Claude d’Aspremont

Abstract

The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Attar & Claude d’Aspremont, 2018. "Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I, chapter 15, pages 425-452, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:16873_15
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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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