Economic theorists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing models of closely related incentive contracting problems that arise in the study of public procurement, private procurement, regulation, the theory of the firm, the theory of organizations, and managerial compensation. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the incentive models literature as it applies to defense procurement.
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ReDIF This chapter was published in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.) Handbook of Defense Economics, , chapter 12, pages 309-346, 1995.
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Related research
This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 1995.
"Handbook of Defense Economics,"
Handbook of Defense Economics,
Elsevier,
edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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