Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games
AbstractWe examine convergence behavior in simple bimatrix games. We classify possible types of simple games, pick interesting examples of each type, and summarize convergence behavior under various information and player matching protocols.
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- Nicole Marie Bouchez & Daniel Friedman, 2001. "Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 00/2, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 2001.
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
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- Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep, 2012. "Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: An evolutionary approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 433-454.
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