Crimes and Punishments?: Retaliation under the WTO
AbstractOne of the unique aspects of the WTO as an international organization is that it authorizes members to retaliate against violations by raising tariffs. These authorizations have become increasingly common and increasingly controversial. In this analysis of the retaliation system, Robert Lawrence considers the guiding principles that govern responses to WTO violations, examines how these principles are implemented in practice, and considers options for reform.
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Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by Peterson Institute for International Economics in its series Peterson Institute Press: All Books with number 372 and published in 2003.
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- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004.
NBER Working Papers
10292, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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