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Crimes and Punishments?: Retaliation under the WTO

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  • Robert Z. Lawrence

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

One of the unique aspects of the WTO as an international organization is that it authorizes members to retaliate against violations by raising tariffs. These authorizations have become increasingly common and increasingly controversial. In this analysis of the retaliation system, Robert Lawrence considers the guiding principles that govern responses to WTO violations, examines how these principles are implemented in practice, and considers options for reform.

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by Peterson Institute for International Economics in its series Peterson Institute Press: All Books with number 372 and published in 2003.

ISBN: 978-0-88132-359-7
Handle: RePEc:iie:ppress:372

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Cited by:
  1. Limão, Nuno & Saggi, Kamal, 2006. "Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 5560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 2004. "Subsidy agreements," Working papers 1, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Limão, Nuno & Saggi, Kamal, 2013. "Size inequality, coordination externalities and international trade agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 10-27.
  4. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2013. "Bite the Bullet: Trade Retaliation, EU Jurisprudence and the Law and Economics of 'Taking One for the Team'," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/32, European University Institute.

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