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Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme

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  • Ellerman,A. Denny
  • Buchner,Barbara K.
  • Carraro,Carlo

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Abstract

A critical issue in dealing with climate change is deciding who has a right to emit carbon dioxide. Originally published in 2007, Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme provided the first in-depth description and analysis of the process by which rights to emit carbon dioxide were created and distributed in the European Union. This was the world's first large-scale experiment with an emission trading system for carbon dioxide and was likely to be copied by others if there was to be a global regime for limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The book comprises contributions from those responsible for putting the allocation into practice in ten representative member states and at the European Commission. The problems encountered in this process, the solutions found, and the choices they made, will be of interest to all who are concerned with climate policy and the use of emissions trading to combat climate change.

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521875684 and published in 2007.

Order: http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521875684
Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521875684

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Web page: http://www.cambridge.org

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Cited by:
  1. Valentina Bosetti & David G. Victor, 2011. "Politics and Economics of Second-Best Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: The Importance of Regulatory Credibility," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-24.
  2. Hanley, Nicholas & Mackenzie, Ian A, 2010. "The effects of rent seeking over tradable pollution permits," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2010-02, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  3. Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2009. "Market-Based Policy Options to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(2), pages 5-27, Spring.
  4. Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisbach, 2008. "The Design of a Carbon Tax," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0728, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  5. Considine , Timothy J. & Larson, Donald F., 2009. "Substitution and technological change under carbon cap and trade : lessons from Europe," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4957, The World Bank.
  6. Philippe Quirion & Damien Demailly, 2008. "Changing the Allocation Rules in the EU ETS: Impact on Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency," Working Papers 2008.89, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. Ian A. MacKenzie,, 2008. "On the Sequential Choice of Tradable Permit Allocations," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/83, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  8. Claudia Kettner & Daniela Kletzan-Slamanig & Angela Köppl, 2011. "The EU Emission Trading Scheme. Allocation Patterns and Trading Flows," WIFO Working Papers 402, WIFO.

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