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Regulatory Bargaining and Public Law

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  • Rossi,Jim

Abstract

This text explores the implications of a bargaining perspective for institutional governance and public law in deregulated industries such as electric power and telecommunications. Leading media accounts blame deregulated markets for failures in competitive restructuring policies. However, the author argues that governmental institutions, often influenced by private stakeholders, share blame for the defects in deregulated markets. The first part of the book explores the minimal role that judicial intervention played for much of the twentieth century in public utility industries and how deregulation presents fresh opportunities and challenges for public law. The second part of the book explores the role of public law in a deregulatory environment, focusing on the positive and negative incentives it creates for the behavior of private stakeholders and public institutions in a bargaining-focused political process.

Suggested Citation

  • Rossi,Jim, 2005. "Regulatory Bargaining and Public Law," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521838924.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521838924
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    Cited by:

    1. Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2007. "Allocating lawmaking powers: Self-regulation vs government regulation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 520-545, September.
    2. Heikki Marjosola, 2021. "The problem of regulatory arbitrage: A transaction cost economics perspective," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(2), pages 388-407, April.
    3. Peter Grajzl, 2011. "A property rights approach to legislative delegation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-200, June.

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