Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct

Contents:

Author Info

  • Breton,Albert
  • Wintrobe,Ronald

Abstract

In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

as in new window
This book is provided by Cambridge University Press in its series Cambridge Books with number 9780521071727 and published in 2008.

Order: http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521071727
Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521071727

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.cambridge.org

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Thomas E. Borcherding & Portia D. Besocke, 2002. "The Contemporary Political Economy Approach to Bureaucracy," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-06, Claremont Colleges.
  2. Breton, Albert, 1995. "Organizational hierarchies and bureaucracies: An integrative essay," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 411-440, September.
  3. Arahata, Katsumi, 2006. "Who Are More Sensitive to Food-Borne Risks in Japan, Consumers or Politicians?: A Political Economy Perspective," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21256, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  4. Valérie Revest & Samira Guennif, 2005. "Social structure and reputation: the NASDAQ case study," Post-Print halshs-00163731, HAL.
  5. Bruno S. Frey & Lasse Steiner, 2010. "Pay as You Go: A New Proposal for Museum Pricing," CREMA Working Paper Series 2010-10, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  6. Arahata, Katsumi, 2005. "Are Japanese bureaucrats politically stronger than farmers?: The political economy of Japan's rice set-aside program," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19422, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  7. Franklin G. Mixon & Ernest W. King, 2009. "Coercion, vertical trust and entrepreneurism in bureaucracies: evidence from the Nazi Holocaust," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 673-679.
  8. Jochimsen, Beate, 2007. "Determinants of service quality in bureaucracy: Parkinson's theory at work," Discussion Papers 2007/11, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  9. Anthony Boardman & Aidan Vining & W. G. Waters, 1993. "Costs and benefits through bureaucratic lenses: Example of a highway project," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 532-555.
  10. Ugo Pagano, 2009. "Marrying in the Cathedral: a Framework for the Analysis of Corporate Governance," Department of Economics University of Siena 571, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  11. Leyden, Dennis & Link, Albert N., 2012. "Knowledge Spillovers, Collective Entrepreneurship, & Economic Growth: The Role of Universities," Working Papers 12-8, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521071727. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ruth Austin).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.