IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wut/journl/v2y2016p31-52id1220.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems

Author

Listed:
  • Francesc Carreras
  • Josep Freixas
  • Antonio Magaña

Abstract

An analysis of three major aspects has been carried out that may apply to any of the successive voting systems used for the European Union Council of Ministers, from the first one established in the Treaty of Rome in 1958 to the current one established in Lisbon. We mainly consider the voting systems designed for the enlarged European Union adopted in the Athens summit, held in April 2003 but this analysis can be applied to any other system. First, it is shown that the dimension of these voting systems does not, in general, reduce. Next, the egalitarian effects of superposing two or three weighted majority games (often by introducing additional consensus) are considered. Finally, the decisiveness of these voting systems is evaluated and compared.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesc Carreras & Josep Freixas & Antonio Magaña, 2016. "Dimension, egalitarianism and decisiveness of European voting systems," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 26(2), pages 31-52.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2016:p:31-52:id:1220
    DOI: 10.5277/ord160203
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ord.pwr.edu.pl/assets/papers_archive/1220%20-%20published.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.5277/ord160203?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mantas Radzvilas & Francesco De Pretis & William Peden & Daniele Tortoli & Barbara Osimani, 2020. "Double blind vs. open review: an evolutionary game logit-simulating the behavior of authors and reviewers," Papers 2011.07797, arXiv.org.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2016:p:31-52:id:1220. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Adam Kasperski (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iopwrpl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.