Do Philanthropic Auditors Provide Higher-Quality Audit Services? Evidence From China

SynopsisThe research problemThis study investigates whether auditors who participate in philanthropic activities (hereafter “philanthropic auditors†) have stronger incentives to deliver high-quality audits than the auditors who do not participate.MotivationPrior studies call for research that examines the difference in audit quality across individual auditors. In recent years, regulators in developed markets, such as the United States and the European Union, have also promulgated new regulations requiring audit firms or public companies to disclose the names of engagement partners. Another growing body of literature examines the effect of economic agents’ personal traits on their decisions and/or firm policies and practices. By examining the impact of individual auditors’ unobservable personal traits on audit quality, measured through their philanthropic actions, we link and contribute to both streams of the above literature.The test hypothesesWe test a null hypothesis in this study: individual auditors’ philanthropic activity is not related to their audit quality.Target populationStakeholders of high-quality auditing including accounting regulators, audit firm partners, and company managers.Adopted methodologyOrdinary least squares (OLS) regressions and archival data.AnalysesIn a sample of more than 19,000 Chinese firm-years from 2008 to 2017, we identified 9.40% of the observations were signed by at least one auditor who contributes either money or time to a charitable activity. We used two measures of audit quality: the propensity to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) and unsigned abnormal discretionary accruals.FindingsFirst, we find that philanthropic auditors are significantly more likely to issue MAOs than are their non-philanthropic counterparts. Second, they are more likely to issue MAOs to distressed companies but not to financially healthy companies. The higher propensity of philanthropic auditors to issue MAOs indicates higher audit quality rather than a higher level of audit conservatism. Third, financial statements audited by philanthropic auditors contain significantly lower discretionary accruals (DACC). Fourth, to mitigate the concern that endogeneity drives our findings, we implement the propensity score matching (PSM) approach and the client fixed effects model. Our finding that philanthropic auditors provide higher-quality audit services than other auditors holds. Fifth, the main results are robust to the inclusion of other individual auditor characteristics, such as gender, educational background, and political affiliation, and to several proxies for individual auditors’ wealth.