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Subgame-Consistent Cooperative Equilibria of Multi-Objective Dynamic Games

Author

Listed:
  • David W. K. Yeung

    (SRS Consortium for Advanced Study, Shue Yan University, Hong Kong2Center of Game Theory, St Petersburg State University, Russia3Department of Finance, Asia University, Taiwan)

  • Leon A. Petrosyan

    (Faculty of Applied Mathematics-Control Processes and Center of Game Theory, St Petersburg State University, Russia)

Abstract

This paper develops subgame consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games. The presence of multiple objectives in decision-making is prevalent and inherent. Given that the set of objectives of each player will be affected by the actions of other players, non-coordinated maximization by individual players could lead to the case where some prominent objectives may reach an undesirably level. Cooperation is the best way to alleviate the problem and enhance the participants’ payoffs. This paper presents the techniques for solving subgame consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games with utility-based players. In such an equilibrium, individual rationality, group efficiency, and subgame consistency are realized. An application of collaboration between Australia and New Zealand is provided. This is the first time that subgame consistent cooperative equilibria are applied in multi-objective dynamic games with utility-based players, ample applications in various fields are expected.

Suggested Citation

  • David W. K. Yeung & Leon A. Petrosyan, 2024. "Subgame-Consistent Cooperative Equilibria of Multi-Objective Dynamic Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 26(01), pages 1-25, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:26:y:2024:i:01:n:s0219198923500202
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198923500202
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