IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wsi/igtrxx/v19y2017i03ns021919891750013x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

Author

Listed:
  • O. V. Baskov

    (Saint Petersburg State University, Universitetskiy prospect, 35, Peterhof, Saint Petersburg, 198504, Russian Federation2Higher School of Economics, Kantemirovskaya st., 3, Saint Petersburg, 194100, Russian Federation)

Abstract

We propose a generalization of the notion of bounded computational capacity equilibrium in repeated zero-sum games played by finite automata. We show that if the players’ mixed strategies are to contain automata of the same size, the equilibrium in our sense does not exist in general, and if the players are allowed to mix automata of different sizes, the equilibrium in our sense always exists.

Suggested Citation

  • O. V. Baskov, 2017. "Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium in Repeated Two-Player Zero-Sum Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(03), pages 1-8, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:03:n:s021919891750013x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021919891750013X
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S021919891750013X
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1142/S021919891750013X?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. O. V. Baskov, 2019. "Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 423-431, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:03:n:s021919891750013x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tai Tone Lim (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.