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Stable Coalition Structures Under Restricted Coalitional Changes

Author

Listed:
  • YUKIHIKO FUNAKI

    (School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan)

  • TAKEHIKO YAMATO

    (Department of Social Engineering, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1-W9-81 Oookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, calledsequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.

Suggested Citation

  • Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato, 2014. "Stable Coalition Structures Under Restricted Coalitional Changes," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(03), pages 1-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:16:y:2014:i:03:n:s0219198914500066
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198914500066
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Elena Parilina & Artem Sedakov, 2016. "Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-20, June.
    2. Marc Willinger & Oussama Rhouma & Klarizze Anne Puzon, 2021. "Veto power and coalition formation in the commons: an experiment," CEE-M Working Papers hal-03227335, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalition formation; stability; farsighted players; Cournot oligopoly; common pool resource; C70; C71; D62;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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