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Project Management Games

Author

Listed:
  • IMMA CURIEL

    (School of Engineering, University of the Netherlands Antilles, Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles)

Abstract

This paper studies situations in which companies can cooperate in order to decrease the earliest completion time of a project that consists of several tasks. This is beneficial for the client who wants the project to be completed as early as possible. The client is willing to pay more for an earlier completion time. The total payoff must be allocated among the companies that cooperate. Cooperative game theory is used to model this situation. Conditions for the core of the game to be nonempty are derived. We study a class of project management games for which necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of the core can be derived. We will show that a subset of the set of balanced project management games can be partitioned into a class of 1-convex games and a class of big boss games. Expressions for the extreme points of the core, the τ-value, the nucleolus, and the Shapley-value of games in these two classes are derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Imma Curiel, 2011. "Project Management Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(03), pages 281-300.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:03:n:s0219198911003003
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198911003003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Álvarez, Xana & Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2019. "Risk prevention of land flood: A cooperative game theory approach," MPRA Paper 91515, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Sheryl Le Chang & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2017. "Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario," Games, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-18, October.
    3. J. C. Gonçalves-Dosantos & I. García-Jurado & J. Costa, 2020. "Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays," 4OR, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 457-476, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Activity on arc network; earliest completion time; critical path; balanced game; 1-convex game; big boss game; 91A12; 91A43; 90B10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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