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Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes

Author

Listed:
  • PAULO P. CÔRTE-REAL

    (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal)

Abstract

In a binary choice voting scenario, voters may have fuzzy preferences but are required to make crisp choices. In order to compare a crisp voting procedure with more general mechanisms of fuzzy preference aggregation, we first focus on the latter. We present a formulation of strategy-proofness in this setting and study its consequences. On one hand, we achieve an axiomatic recommendation of the median as the aggregation rule for fuzzy preferences. On the other hand, we present conditions under which strategic concerns imply the optimality of a crisp voting procedure and argue that there is a potential gain in the integration of the preference and choice aggregation programs — namely that an underlying fuzzy preference structure may also help inform the selection of a choice aggregation rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Paulo P. Côrte-Real, 2007. "Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(01), pages 67-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:n:s021919890700128x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021919890700128X
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fuzzy preferences; strategy-proofness; aggregation rule; social choice; JEL Classification: D71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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