Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Ownership Concentration and Governance in the U.S. Insurance Industry

Contents:

Author Info

  • James Barrese
  • Gene Lai
  • Nicos Scordis

Abstract

Concentration in the U.S. insurance industry’s market shares and ownership, coupled with a network interlocking ownership relationships by institutional investors, raise social concerns. Studying the relationship between Tobin’s q and corporate governance features of the industry, we fail to find support for the incentive alignment or entrenchment hypotheses, but our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that controlling owners may couple with others to expropriate private value from minority shareholders. An interesting observation from the study is the degree to which family control is prevalent in the industry; combining family control and institutional ownership makes most stock insurers closely held.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.insuranceissues.org/PDFs/301BLS.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Risk and Insurance Association in its journal Journal of Insurance Issues.

Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-20

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:wri:journl:v:30:y:2007:i:1:p:1-20

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wri:journl:v:30:y:2007:i:1:p:1-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (James Barrese).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.