IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v36y2015i7p470-486.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Do Strategic Alliances Persist? A Behavioral Decision Model

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Klossek
  • Klaus E. Meyer
  • Michael Nippa

Abstract

Strategic alliances are considered a flexible form of organizing, yet they are often long‐lived. Even when systematic benefit–cost analysis suggests that their organizational form should be changed or terminated, some alliances still persist. Drawing on behavioral decision theory, we propose a theoretical model that explains this phenomenon. Decision makers are subject to a variety of biases that can lead to the overvaluation of the net benefits of an alliance and, hence, inhibit the change or discontinuation of underperforming alliances. Our model illustrates how decision‐making biases at the individual, interpersonal, organizational, and interorganizational levels are moderated by the design of an alliance and the tools employed in the decision‐making process. This behavioral decision perspective advances our theoretical understanding of the longevity of strategic alliances and their embeddedness in complex decision‐making contexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Klossek & Klaus E. Meyer & Michael Nippa, 2015. "Why Do Strategic Alliances Persist? A Behavioral Decision Model," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(7), pages 470-486, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:36:y:2015:i:7:p:470-486
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael Nippa & Jeffrey J Reuer, 2019. "On the future of international joint venture research," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(4), pages 555-597, June.
    2. Alejandro Montecinos‐Pearce & Pablo Rodrigo & Ignacio J. Duran, 2020. "When is escalation of commitment unstoppable in group settings? An iterative economic modeling approach to unveil the dark side of group decision‐making," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1387-1402, December.
    3. Douglas Dow & Peter Liesch & Lawrence Welch, 2018. "Inertia and Managerial Intentionality: Extending the Uppsala Model," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 465-493, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:36:y:2015:i:7:p:470-486. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.