IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/emetrp/v85y2017i6p1921-1948.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Value of Persistent Information

Author

Listed:
  • Marcin Pęski
  • Juuso Toikka

Abstract

We develop a theory of how the value of an agent's information advantage depends on the persistence of information. We focus on strategic situations with strict conflict of interest, formalized as stochastic zero‐sum games where only one of the players observes the state that evolves according to a Markov operator. Operator Q is said to be better for the informed player than operator P if the value of the game under Q is higher than under P regardless of the stage game. We show that this defines a convex partial order on the space of ergodic Markov operators. Our main result is a full characterization of this partial order, intepretable as an ordinal notion of persistence relevant for games. The analysis relies on a novel characterization of the value of a stochastic game with incomplete information.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Pęski & Juuso Toikka, 2017. "Value of Persistent Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1921-1948, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i:6:p:1921-1948
    DOI: 10.3982/ECTA14330
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14330
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3982/ECTA14330?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mills, Brian M. & Salaga, Steven, 2018. "A natural experiment for efficient markets: Information quality and influential agents," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 23-39.
    2. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
    3. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i:6:p:1921-1948. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.