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Incentive Contracts and the Allocation of Talent

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  • Yanhui Wu

Abstract

This article develops a theory of sorting that links ability, pay†performance sensitivity and pay levels. Firms employ managers to improve productivity. Because of limited liability, firms use incentive contracts to elicit managerial effort; the type of optimal contract depends on a manager's ability. In equilibrium, individuals are sorted based on ability into production workers, business owners, managers paid an ability†invariant bonus, and managers whose pay varies with ability and firm size. The model generates predictions regarding the effects of technological progress and product competition on the distributions of wages, pay structure and employment across a wide range of managerial levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Yanhui Wu, 2017. "Incentive Contracts and the Allocation of Talent," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(607), pages 2744-2783, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:607:p:2744-2783
    DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12397
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    Cited by:

    1. Mishra, Chandra S., 2020. "Are frequent acquirers more entrenched?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    2. Dam, Kaniṣka & Robinson-Cortés, Alejandro, 2020. "Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: How does firm entry shape managerial incentives?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 60-77.
    3. Chen, Cheng, 2019. "Trade liberalization, agency problem and aggregate productivity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 421-442.

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