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On the Existence of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching

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  • Darong Dai

    ()
    (Nanjing University, Nanjing, China)

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    Abstract

    In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of populations by employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game equilibrium of a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is derived by introducing optimal-stopping technique into evolutionary game theory, which combines with the Pareto optimal standard leads us to the existence of Pareto optimal endogenous matching.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Weissberg Publishing in its journal Economic Research Guardian.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (December)
    Pages: 201-224

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    Handle: RePEc:wei:journl:v:2:y:2012:i:2:p:201-224

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    Related research

    Keywords: Stochastic differential cooperative game on time; Endogenous matching; Fair matching; Pareto optimality; Adaptive learning;

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