This paper argues that the existence of social capital can substitute for well-defined legal property rights in both private and common property resource tenure regimes. A comparative analysis of two regions in Guatemala suggests that, where significant social capital exists among natural resource users, it fosters a sense of ownership and respect for boundaries, and provides the foundation for use rules, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms which help preserve the natural resource base. In contrast, an absence of social capital in a situation where property rights are poorly defined can lead to resource mining in both private and common property regime
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Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
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