Schooling as Human Capital or a Signal: Some Evidence
AbstractA new way is proposed to distinguish between the human capital and the signaling theories of the value of education. If education is a signal, then the essence of the signal should be distilled in the position of an individual in the distribution of education for his cohort. Estimating earnings equations that include both absolute (years) and relative (percentile) measures of education provides a test of the two competing theories. Analyzing two separate panel data sources under a range of alternative specifications, we find that the years measure of schooling has a consistently significant positive effect on earnings, but that the rank measure rarely does. This evidence supports the conclusion that human capital rather than signaling is the predominant explanation of schooling's value.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.
Volume (Year): 29 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://jhr.uwpress.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Robert Wagner & Thomas Zwick, 2012.
"How Acid are Lemons? Adverse Selection and Signalling for Skilled Labour Market Entrants,"
Economics of Education Working Paper Series
0071, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Feb 2012.
- Wagner, Robert & Zwick, Thomas, 2012. "How acid are lemons? Adverse selection and signalling for skilled labour market entrants," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-014, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- M. De Paola & V. Scoppa, 2007. "Returns to skills, incentives to study and optimal educational standards," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(3), pages 229-262, December.
- Perri, Timothy J., 2002. "Signaling versus contingent contracts with costly turnover," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 365-374, August.
- Bergh, Andreas & Fink, Günther, 2009. "Higher education, elite institutions and inequality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 376-384, April.
- Uschi Backes-Gellner & Stephan Veen, 2006.
"Incentives for Schools, Educational Signals and Labour Market Outcomes,"
0061, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jun 2006.
- Uschi Backes-Gellner & Stephan Veen, 2006. "Incentives for Schools, Educational Signals and Labour Market Outcomes," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0009, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jun 2006.
- Nohora Y. Forero Ramírez & Manuel Ramírez Gómez, 2008. "Determinantes de los ingresos laborales de los graduados universitarios durante el período 2001-2004," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 004591, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
- Luisa Rosti & Chikara Yamaguchi & Carolina Castagnetti, 2005. "Educational Performance as Signalling Device: Evidence from Italy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(4), pages 1-7.
- Sebastian Stolorz, 2005. "A Test of the Signalling Hypothesis - Evidence from Natural Experiment," Labor and Demography 0512008, EconWPA.
- Spetz, Joanne, 2002. "The value of education in a licensed profession: the choice of associate or baccalaureate degrees in nursing," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 73-85, February.
- Dolton, Peter & Vignoles, Anna, 2000. "The incidence and effects of overeducation in the U.K. graduate labour market," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 179-198, April.
- Dolton, P. J. & Vignoles, A., 2002. "Is a broader curriculum better?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 415-429, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.