This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Autorregulación con la posibilidad de corrupción

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Javier Núñez
Guillermo Díaz
Miguel Vargas ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Este trabajo investiga los incentivos que tienen organismos autorregulados (OA) para una regulación de calidad efectiva. Se plantea un análisis de agencia, según el cual dentro del OA existe un principal encargado de vigilar el cumplimiento de los estándares de calidad por parte de los miembros del OA (agentes), y de denunciar a quienes no lo hagan. La motivación para esta actividad regulatoria es reputacional, dado un contexto de información asimétrica entre el OA y los consumidores: estos no pueden observar la calidad de los bienes provistos por el OA. Así la clidad surge endógenamente a partir de la interacción estratégica entre agente y principal. El presente trabajo analiza como la posibilidad de corrupción afecta los incentivos de un esquema de autorregulación (AR). Corrupción significa que los agentes sorprendidos cometiendo fraude (incumplimiento de estándares de calidad) pagan un soborno para evitar ser castigados. El principal resultado encontrado es que el equilibrio más probables es aque

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://econ.uchile.cl/public/Archivos/pub/83ae869c-481d-4ce7-87c9-17131e6dee71.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its journal Estudios de Economia.

Volume (Year): 30 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 Year 2003 (December)
Pages: 179-198
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:30:y:2003:i:2:p:179-198

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Verónica Kunze).

Related research
Keywords: Organismos Autorregulados; credence goods; juegos dinámicos con información incompleta; agente-principal.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.