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Accuracy in Public Law Enforcement under Political Competition

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  • Marie Obidzinski

Abstract

The article investigates the impact of political competition on the level of accuracy in law enforcement. The model looks at the potential distortions implied by political competition relative to the Beckerian benchmark, where a benevolent social planner decides on the resources allocated to accuracy. I show that an elected law enforcer may promote a lower level of accuracy (for crimes inducing moderate harm) or a higher level of accuracy (for crimes inducing extensive harm) than the socially optimal level. Potential extensions are discussed in the last section.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Obidzinski, 2019. "Accuracy in Public Law Enforcement under Political Competition," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 195-212.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:scerev:doi:10.1086/704215
    DOI: 10.1086/704215
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    Cited by:

    1. Yahagi, Ken & Yamaguchi, Yohei, 2023. "Law enforcement with rent-seeking government under voting pressure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    2. Murat C Mungan & Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error," Working Papers hal-04229266, HAL.
    3. Yahagi, Ken, 2021. "Law enforcement with motivated agents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    4. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.

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