IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/renvpo/doi10.1086-728371.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Inequality Aversion for Climate Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Stellio Del Campo
  • David Anthoff
  • Ulrike Kornek

Abstract

A sizable body of literature on climate economics uses the notion of inequality aversion. This is the idea that a society will give up some personal benefits or economic efficiency to achieve greater equality. We review and synthesize published estimates of inequality aversion to guide this literature. We review both normative studies (which treat ethical values as axioms from which good behavior is deduced) and empirical studies (which try to infer a society’s beliefs about inequality from its public policy decisions). In the normative case, a variety of ethical principles underlie the recommendations for inequality aversion. The empirical studies use various methods to present estimates based on some form of “revealed ethics,” in which a society’s actions or individuals’ responses unveil preferences to reduce inequality. Examples include progressive income tax schedules or the level of foreign aid. In these empirical studies, we find strong support for the view that people are averse to inequality, but only to a limited degree. Studies that look at domestic policies support values between one and four (where zero indicates no aversion toward inequality). By contrast, studies that look at foreign aid find lower values, ranging from above zero to one.

Suggested Citation

  • Stellio Del Campo & David Anthoff & Ulrike Kornek, 2024. "Inequality Aversion for Climate Policy," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 96-115.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:renvpo:doi:10.1086/728371
    DOI: 10.1086/728371
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/728371
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/728371
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/728371?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:renvpo:doi:10.1086/728371. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/REEP .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.