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Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Model s

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Author Info
Sjostrom, William

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Abstract

In markets with avoidable fixed costs, the core may be empty. The author argues that a reason for collusion is to impose an equilibrium where none exists. He sets up a framework for deriving testable implications from the model and compares those implications with those of a cartel model. The author compares the two models empirically with data from liner shipping conferences, legal collusive agreements that have been in force for over a century, and concludes that the evidence supports the theory of the core. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 97 (1989)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
Pages: 1160-79
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:5:p:1160-79

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  1. MarĂ­n Uribe, Pedro Luis, 2001. "Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping," CEPR Discussion Papers 2828, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jingang Zhao, 1998. "Non-Empty Core as a Precondition for Horizontal Merger: Core Existence without Using Balancedness," Working Papers 98-07, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kenneth Button & Peter Nijkamp, 1997. "Network Industries, Economic Stability and Spatial Integration," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-047/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  5. Francois, Joseph & Wooton, Ian, 2000. "Trade in International Transport Services: The Role of Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2377, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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