Fragmented Duopoly: A Conceptual and Empirical Investigation
AbstractWhere wireline distribution networks compete, each network typically has some customers over which it competes and others for which it is the sole provider. This paper conceptually and empirically assesses the effects of such competition on market prices, demand, and service quality for cable television service. The results suggest that the effectiveness of competition in lowering prices is contingent on the degree of system overlap. In particular, in equilibrium, an increase in overlap substantially reduces prices. The conceptual model of fragmented duopoly developed in the paper may be useful in analyzing emerging competition in other network distribution industries.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 78 (2005)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/
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