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Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition

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Author Info
French, Kenneth R
McCormick, Robert E

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-9398%28198410%2957%3A4%3C417%3ASBSCAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.

Volume (Year): 57 (1984)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 417-41
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:57:y:1984:i:4:p:417-41

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  1. Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
  2. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, . "Corporate Restructuring and Corporate Auctions," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-38, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0504, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Xianwen Shi & Juuso Valimaki, 2008. "Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-307, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Roberto Burguet, 2000. "Auction theory: a guided tour," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(1), pages 3-50, January. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Eiichiro Kazumori & John McMillan, 2003. "Selliing Online Versus Offline," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000254, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Lu, Jingfeng, 2006. "Auctions design with private costs of valuation discovery," MPRA Paper 943, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, 1991. "Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation," Papers of Peter Cramton 91jleo, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Ian Gale & Mark Stegeman, 1994. "Exclusion in all-pay auctions," Working Paper 9401, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  11. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
  12. Jingfeng Lu, 2009. "Why a Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 181-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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