On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
AbstractThere has been a spate of interest in the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to issues in the law. This theorem holds that a majority vote among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome. Its uses have ranged from estimating the correct size of juries to justifying the voting of creditors in Chapter 11 reorganizations. While the mathematics is unassailable, the legal interpretation of the conclusion is dependent on the model of probability one uses when invoking the assumption that the voters are "more likely than not to vote correctly." In this paper, I show how different probabilistic models lead to different interpretations of the results. Establishing which is the appropriate model has normative implications as well. This analysis is then employed in critiquing the work of Saul Levmore and of Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager. Copyright 2002 by the University of Chicago.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 31 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.