Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Procedural versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions


Author Info

  • Priest, George L
Registered author(s):


    Class certification in a mass tort case confers extraordinary negotiating power even where the underlying claim is meritless. This power stems from the prosper that claims of a large-numbered class might reach a jury that might render a larger aggregate judgment under our vastly looser tort law standards. The power is so extreme that all mass tort claims certified as classes appear to settle, rather than litigate to judgment. Recommendations for class action reform have been solely procedural since Rule 23 has been implemented without substantive review of the underlying claim. This article shows that recent reform efforts in fact attempt to Impose substantive controls on mass tort class actions through procedural means, efforts that necessarily will remain inadequate. The various problems attending mass tort class actions can only be effectively addressed if courts are given power to substantively review the underlying merits of a claim prior to class certification. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

    Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 521-73

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:521-73

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page:

    Related research



    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May.
    2. Heaton, J.B., 2005. "Settlement Pressure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 264-275, June.
    3. Michelle J. White, 2002. "Explaining the Flood of Asbestos Litigation: Consolidation, Bifurcation, and Bouquet Trials," NBER Working Papers 9362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Schwartz, Warren F., 1999. "Long Shot Class Actions," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7fv8k94q, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.


    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:521-73. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.