IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/doi10.1086-722541.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does Government Play Favorites? Evidence from Opportunity Zones

Author

Listed:
  • Ofer Eldar
  • Chelsea Garber

Abstract

The Opportunity Zone (OZ) program is one of the most comprehensive to promote development in distressed communities. A criticized feature is that state governors designate zones as OZs from many eligible tracts without scrutiny. We find that governors are more likely to select tracts with higher distress levels and tracts on an upward economic trajectory, which indicates that they select OZs in a systematic way on the basis of objective criteria. However, we also provide evidence that favoritism plays a role in governors’ decisions. The OZ designation is more likely for tracts in counties that supported the governor in an election and when executives or firms with an economic interest in the tract donated to the governor’s campaign. We further explore whether transparency and accountability measures affected states’ decisions. Our analysis suggests that while most measures had no discernible impact, publishing draft selections may mitigate favoritism and promote systematic decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Ofer Eldar & Chelsea Garber, 2023. "Does Government Play Favorites? Evidence from Opportunity Zones," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(1), pages 111-141.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/722541
    DOI: 10.1086/722541
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722541
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722541
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/722541?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/722541. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.