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Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Steven Tenn

    (Federal Trade Commission)

  • Brett W. Wendling

    (Federal Trade Commission)

Abstract

We use the unique regulatory environment of the pharmaceutical industry to examine how potential competition affects generic drug pricing. Our identification strategy exploits a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act that awards 180 days of marketing exclusivity to the first valid generic drug applicant against the holder of a branded drug patent. In smaller drug markets, we find that price falls in response to an increase in potential competition. We also find that few manufacturers enter these markets, indicating this price reduction is an effective deterrent. In contrast, we find that generic incumbents accommodate entry in larger drug markets. © No rights reserved. This work was authored as part of the Contributor's official duties as an Employee of the United States Government and is therefore a work of the United States Government. In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 105, no copyright protection is available for such works under U.S. law.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Tenn & Brett W. Wendling, 2014. "Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 96(2), pages 214-228, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:96:y:2014:i:2:p:214-228
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hu, Bill & Hwang, Joon Ho & Jiang, Christine & Washam, Jim & Zeng, Li, 2022. "Down to the cents: The case of international drug prices," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
    2. Musa Abdu & Adamu Jibir, 2019. "Sources of Market Power among Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa: Do Institutions Matter in Competitive Policies?," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 115-148, July-Dec.
    3. Victoria Serra-Sastre & Simona Bianchi & Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz & Phill O’Neill, 2021. "Does NICE influence the adoption and uptake of generics in the UK?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 22(2), pages 229-242, March.
    4. Luke M. Olson & Brett W. Wendling, 2018. "Estimating the Causal Effect of Entry on Generic Drug Prices Using Hatch–Waxman Exclusivity," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(1), pages 139-172, August.
    5. Bet, Germán, 2021. "Product specification under a threat of entry: Evidence from Airlines’ departure times," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Serra-Sastre, Victoria & Bianchi, Simona & Mestre-Ferrandiz, Jorge & O’Neill, Phill, 2021. "Does NICE influence the adoption and uptake of generics in the UK?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113639, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Daniel Hosken & David Schmidt & Matthew C. Weinberg, 2020. "Any Willing Provider and Negotiated Retail Pharmaceutical Prices," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 1-39, March.
    8. Cici McNamara & Natalia Serna, 2022. "The impact of a national formulary expansion on diabetics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(11), pages 2311-2332, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    potential competition; entry deterrence; pharmaceutical; pricing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics

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