Secessions and Political Extremism: Why Regional Referenda Do Not Solve the Problem
AbstractThis paper shows that an uninformed player can increase his bargaining power by committing to receive information from an expert more skeptical to cooperation. This general idea is applied to a model in which a regional political leader (the expert) influences voting in a referendum on independence by strategically disseminating information about the consequences of separation. I show that this motivates a moderate electorate to appoint a more extreme leader, to receive biased information that increases their bargaining power over the gains of staying unified. However, a trade-off between bargaining power and precision of information causes inefficient outcomes in equilibrium. (JEL: C73, D72, D82, H77) Copyright (c) 2004 by the European Economic Association.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 2 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 (09)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ludema, Rodney D. & Olofsgard, Anders, 2008.
"Delegation versus communication in the organization of government,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 213-235, February.
- Rodney D. Ludema & Anders Olofsgård, 2006. "Delegation versus Communication in the Organization of Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Vincent Anesi, 2010.
"Secessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World,"
2010-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Anesi, Vincent, 2012. "Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 53-61.
- Vincent Anesi, 2010. "Secessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World," Discussion Papers 2010-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2008.
"Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions,"
Vives discussion paper series
2, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, Vives.
- Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2008. "Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2455, CESifo Group Munich.
- Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011.
"Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression,"
2011/40, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Vincent Anesi & Philippe De Donder, 2011. "Voting under the Threat of Secession: Accommodation vs. Repression," CESifo Working Paper Series 3458, CESifo Group Munich.
- Libman, Alexander Mikhailovich, 2009.
"Эндогенные Границы И Распределение Власти В Федерациях И Международных Сообществах
[ENDOGENOUS BOUNDARIES AND DISTRIBUTION O," MPRA Paper 16473, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karie Kirkpatrick).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.