Juro Teranishi (Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Naka 2-1 Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan 186-0042.)
Abstract
The evolution of investor rights in Japan is examined in relation to the evolution in firm-specific skill formation. Asset holders (shareholders and landlords) delegated part of the control of their assets to actual producers (managers, workers, and tenant farmers) to maximize the benefits of firm-specific skill formation by the producers. A cautious approach is therefore needed in adjusting investor rights in Japan to global standards: stronger investor rights could enhance allocative efficiency of financial resources, but they could also be harmful to organizational efficiency based on investment by employees in firm-specific skills. (c) 2006 The Earth Institute at Columbia University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Volume (Year): 5 (2006) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 36-63 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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