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Robust performance evaluation of independent agents

Author

Listed:
  • Kambhampati, Ashwin

    (Department of Economics, United States Naval Academy)

Abstract

A principal provides incentives for independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that an anti-informativeness principle holds: very generally, robustly optimal contracts must link the incentive pay of the agents. In symmetric and binary environments, they must exhibit joint performance evaluation — each agent's pay is increasing in the performance of the other.

Suggested Citation

  • Kambhampati, Ashwin, 0. "Robust performance evaluation of independent agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:5523
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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/5523/38944/1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; robustness; teams;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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