IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/rpxmxx/v25y2023i7p1282-1308.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Satisficing or maximizing in public–private partnerships? A laboratory experiment on strategic bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Kristina S. Weißmüller
  • Robin Bouwman
  • Rick Vogel

Abstract

Cross-sectoral strategic negotiation is a key challenge in PPPs. Based on framing and game theory, we investigate the effect of sectoral agency, affect, and bargaining domain on sectoral agents’ bargaining behaviour in a PPP renegotiation scenario. Results confirm that public agents are more likely to bargain for satisfactory, ‘good enough’ contracts than private agents, who maximize their utility. This difference is stronger in the loss vis-a-vis the gain domain. These experimental findings advance our understanding of psychological mechanisms underlying cross-sectoral negotiations, suggesting that public managers and policy-makers account for partners’ dissimilar bargaining logics to prevent asymmetric loss socialization in PPPs.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristina S. Weißmüller & Robin Bouwman & Rick Vogel, 2023. "Satisficing or maximizing in public–private partnerships? A laboratory experiment on strategic bargaining," Public Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(7), pages 1282-1308, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rpxmxx:v:25:y:2023:i:7:p:1282-1308
    DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2021.2013072
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/14719037.2021.2013072
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/14719037.2021.2013072?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:rpxmxx:v:25:y:2023:i:7:p:1282-1308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/rpxm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.