Governance, legitimacy, and decision-making capability of the Chinese national social security fund-against the backdrop of international comparison

To deal with the pension crisis, many countries have established the ‘Public Pension Reserve Funds (PPRFs)’. The Chinese government has also established the Chinese National Social Security Fund (NSSF), a typical PPRF to deal with the Chinese pension crisis. This paper focuses on the governance issues of the Chinese NSSF. More specifically, it focuses on the NSSF’s board to determine its decision-making capabilities, during which I will talk about the expertise and representation issues in the NSSF. The paper found that, first, the NSSF’s board may have more symbolic significance than substantive powers, which may be the result of the government’s endorsement of the legitimacy of the NSSF. Second, we found that the representation and expertise tension that prevail in Western pension funds governance also exist in China’s NSSF, and the analytical framework for this tension is also applicable to the discussion of Chinese cases. Third, through international comparison, we infer that an efficient board of directors might be a necessary condition for the pension funds’ good performance, but not a sufficient condition.