Economic Theory and Rationality: A Wittgensteinian interpretation

In this paper we invoke Wittgenstein's later philosophy to facilitate a number of methodological reflections on Paul Davidson's concept of transmutability. We argue that, while Davidson addresses the economic implications arising from his distinction between immutable and transmutable theories of external economic reality, he does not explore the more fundamental methodological implications of the concepts contained in his distinction, particularly that of transmutability. Transmutability is more fundamental and pervasive than Davidson had anticipated and presents a number of challenges to economic methodology and economic theorizing. Methodologically, the challenges require the consideration of new philosophical perspectives along with the fundamental reconsideration of widely accepted and influential modes of reasoning in economics. We respond to these challenges by invoking Wittgenstein's later philosophy to challenge the dominance of J. S. Mill's rationale for the immutability of economic laws; to motivate the empirical study of complex transformative processes; and to undermine the reductionist neoclassical theory of rationality.