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Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform

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  • Chengze Simon Fan
  • Herschel I. Grossman

Abstract

This paper argues that, given the legacy of Chinese communism and its political structure, corruption, together with the threat of punishment for corruption and the selective enforcement of this threat, serves as a method of compensation that both satisfies the political objectives of the Communist Party and provides an effective inducement to local officials to promote economic reform.

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File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13841280108523419
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Journal of Economic Policy Reform.

Volume (Year): 4 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 195-206

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Handle: RePEc:taf:jpolrf:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:195-206

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Related research

Keywords: Incentives; Corruption; Economic Reform; China; Communist Party;

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References

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  1. Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1998. "Information Accumulation in Development," Papers 652, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  2. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-S293, December.
  3. Chen, Kang & Jefferson, Gary H. & Singh, Inderjit, 1992. "Lessons from China's economic reform," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 201-225, June.
  4. Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Working papers 96-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
  6. Blanchard, O & Kremer, M, 1996. "Disorganization," Working papers 96-30, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.
  8. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
  9. Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Gordon, Roger H & Li, David Daokui, 1997. "Taxes and Government Incentives: Eastern Europe vs. China," CEPR Discussion Papers 1657, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Li, 2009. "The Duality of Crony Corruption in Economic Transition: Toward an Integrated Framework," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 41-55, March.
  2. Bingqin Li & Gong Sen, 2003. "Social inequalities and wage, housing and pension reforms in urban China," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 21778, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Alexandra Reppegather & Manuela Troschke, 2006. "Graduelle Transformation von Wirtschaftsordnungen: Ein Vergleich der Reformstrategien Chinas und Usbekistans," Working Papers 260, Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and South-East European Studies).

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