An explanation of share tenancy in terms of unemployment, social norms and power
AbstractDue to persistent unemployment, peasant families in developing countries tend to employ more labour on the leased in land plots than a capitalist would. In labour surplus societies, therefore, landlords may earn higher surplus from leasing out land than from self-cultivation. By endogenising disguised unemployment this paper shows that greater power and unity of landlords and conservative social norms may explain the persistence of share tenancy in developing economies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.
Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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