Democracy, capital flows, and odious debt
AbstractThis paper relates democracy, public and private international capital flows, and odious debt. Democracy commits a ruler to pass borrowed funds on to the private sector which builds the country's international collateral, and the consequent rise in the credit ceiling is a Pareto-improvement within a range because the ruler can appropriate a smaller share of the rising loan. However, the ruler may still impose odious debt in the sense that the private sector prefers the country to borrow less. Under certain conditions, a fall in the world interest rate or a rise in productivity growth increases the optimal levels of democracy, borrowing, investment, and welfare. I offer suggestive evidence from a global panel.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.
Volume (Year): 18 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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