A Classroom Auction With Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions
AbstractThe authors describe an in-class exercise in which students participate in an auction to buy US Airways. The exercise is based on events of late 1995, in which neither United nor American Airlines decided to bid for US Airways. Two teams of students participate in an English auction. Students learn that the equilibrium of the sequential game is that neither firm bid and, thereby, learn why US Airways did not sell at that time. In addition, two other teams participate in a sealed-bid auction, in which US Airways will sell in Nash equilibrium. Results typically have lined up with theoretical predictions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of Economic Education.
Volume (Year): 38 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Contact details of provider:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Juan Luis Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero & Ancor Suárez, 2011. "Debating as a classroom tool for adapting learning outcomes to the European higher education area," IREA Working Papers 201109, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Jun 2011.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.