Information and Pollution Permit Markets: Another View
AbstractAbstract : In a recent article, Smith and Yates (2003) argued that regulators could gain additional information about the optimal number of permits to issue from two-sided markets. The author argues that they are incorrect in their assertion because the market they refer to is an asymmetric two-sided market in which individuals are only allowed to decrease the number of permits. When a symmetric two-sided market is considered, the public good nature of the problem makes it unlikely that any useful information can come from a two-sided market.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal The Journal of Economic Education.
Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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