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Political contributions and corruption in the United States

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  • Omer Gokcekus
  • Sertac Sonan

Abstract

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.

Suggested Citation

  • Omer Gokcekus & Sertac Sonan, 2017. "Political contributions and corruption in the United States," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 20(4), pages 360-372, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecprf:v:20:y:2017:i:4:p:360-372
    DOI: 10.1080/17487870.2016.1258312
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    Cited by:

    1. Abbas Khandan, 2022. "Externalities in the rent-seeking strategies of lobbying and bribery," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 46(3), pages 421-450.
    2. Roberto Dell’Anno, 2020. "Corruption around the world: an analysis by partial least squares—structural equation modeling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 327-350, September.

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