Promotions Solely Based on Initial Evaluations
AbstractThis paper analyzes a case where a competition for a promotion chance among the employees may cause an inefficiency inside a firm or an organization. It is shown that a firm or an organization can avoid the inefficiency by promoting employees not based on their job performances after entering a firm or an organization, but based on the initial evaluation scores that the employees get before they enter it. This means that there exist some cases where using only the monetary compensation turns out to be more efficient rather than using the promotion chance as an incentive for the employees.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal International Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 23 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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